Projected Inaction:

Tripartite Canadian

Foreign Policy and Climate

Change-Induced Forced Migration

Laurel Carlton

There is “high agreement and much evidence” that anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions have caused the observed increases in global average temperature since the mid-20th century. This ‘global warming’ is resulting in “abrupt or irreversible” environmental changes[1], including melting permafrost, increasingly extreme temperatures, rising sea levels, and increased natural and humanitarian disasters.[2] As the global average temperature is projected to continue rising, these consequences are expected to worsen.[3] Ironically, the world’s poorest, those who have contributed least to greenhouse gas emissions, will bear the immediate brunt of climate change despite being the least equipped to adapt.[4] Consequently, climate change is expected to reinforce global inequalities, “exacerbate[ing] inequities in health status and access to adequate food, clean water, and other resources”.[5]

As the effects of climate change set in, they will challenge many communities’ “adaptive capacities,” overwhelming some and destroying the carrying capacity of their land, ultimately driving mass displacement.[6] Some effects, like natural disasters, will temporarily force the migration of many[7], while slow-onset processes like rising sea levels and desertification are projected to permanently displace millions.[8] This issue will significantly shape future global politics, as it is projected that there will be “as many as 200 million” ‘environmental refugees’ within the next 50 years.[9] Critically, regional and international infrastructure for addressing this issue remains undeveloped.

Many dynamics of these migratory flows remain speculative, and the debate about those forcibly displaced by climate change is inconclusive. Nonetheless, the incidences of natural disasters are increasing[10] and the effects of slow-onset processes are becoming ever more apparent: melting permafrost has displaced the Yup’ik Inuit of Alaska[11], and rising sea levels have begun to force the permanent migration of the inhabitants of Tuvalu[12] and the Carteret Islands.[13] As more incidences of climate change-induced forced displacement emerge, a global response to this crisis will be absolutely necessary.

As a member of the global community, these patterns of mass migration will have significant implications for Canada. Therefore, through an examination of the three ‘pillars’ of Canadian foreign policy – humanitarian impulses, political interests, and economic goals – I will both consider the effects of this forced displacement on foreign policy, and will speculate about Canada’s most probable actions. To do so, I will first review the projected impacts of climate change on migration, followed by a brief justification of the semantics used in this paper. From there, I will examine this issue through the lens of Canadian foreign policy to ultimately demonstrate that Canadian action on this issue is highly unlikely. Finally, I will briefly discuss how the fulfillment of Canadian commitments to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change represents the most promising path to addressing the root of this problem.

Climate Change: A Migratory ‘Push’ Factor

Although often overlooked in favour of scientific and political discourses, the social implications of climate change are expected to be devastating. These issues are highly complex, as demonstrated by the most recent Human Development Report by the United Nations Development Programme[14], and the following will but briefly discuss the human impacts, with an emphasis on the projected impacts on human migratory patterns.

It is predicted that even the slightest changes in global average temperature will have significant repercussions. The glacial melting is projected to threaten water supplies for millions, while others are forecast to face increased flood risks.[15] Both agricultural production and food security are also expected to suffer considerably: for example, some regions will be rendered completely infertile[16] and the “additional number affected by malnutrition could rise to 600 million by 2080”.[17] On a related note, climate change is projected to exacerbate the spread of diseases and parasites.[18] Furthermore, infrastructure of all types is threatened by slow-onset processes like rising sea levels[19], as well as the ever-increasing[20] trend in “climate disasters” like monsoons, droughts, floods, and hurricanes.[21] Ultimately, in light of these projected challenges, global climate change is expected to thwart the accomplishment of the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals.[22] Indeed, as well articulated by the UNDP report, “the danger is that [climate change] will stall and then reverse progress built-up over generations not just in cutting extreme poverty, but in health, nutrition, education and other areas”.[23]

All of these factors are expected to interact with migratory flows – in 1990, the IPCC projected that the greatest impact of climate change could be on human migration.[24] Environmental factors have long driven migration and forced displacement[25], however climate change presents unprecedented dynamics: it is expected to exacerbate already existing environmental degradation[26] and to completely and permanently destroy many regions’ carrying capacity.[27]

Among the many projected problems, glacial lake outbursts are expected to cause flooding, displacing many in places like Nepal and Peru.[28] The hydrological cycle is also forecast to intensify, changing rainfall patterns and resulting in the increased frequency of extreme weather events like storms, floods, and droughts.[29] Furthermore, more damaging droughts are projected to cause both temporary and permanent displacements, particularly in Western Africa.[30] As “the proportion of land suffering extreme drought is predicted to increase from 1 percent at present to 30 percent by the end of the 21st century,” the region’s carrying capacity will likely diminish significantly.[31] Indeed, Sahel women already walk up to 25 kilometres a day for water, and they will be forced to migrate if this journey becomes any longer.[32]

It is also predicted that rising sea levels will be a major ‘push’ factor for migration with “devastating implications,” as one-third of the world’s ever-increasing population currently lives within sixty kilometres of a coastline.[33] Millions are expected to be displaced in countries like Egypt, India, China, and Bangladesh, where low-lying deltas are highly populated.[34] Furthermore, the Pacific small island states are highly vulnerable to rising sea levels, a fact well demonstrated by the plight of the Carteret Islands of Papua New Guinea[35], the Maldives[36], and Tuvalu.[37] All three have recently sought different solutions: inhabitants of the Carterets have been relocated to the nearby island of Bougainville[38], the President of the Maldives is attempting to purchase a new island for his people[39], and New Zealand has responded to a plea by Tuvalu’s Prime Minister by allowing seventy-five Tuvaluans to relocate annually.[40],[41]

In general, the carrying capacities of many regions will likely be compromised by climate change, displacing millions.[42] It is important to note, however, the problematic nature of causal links between migration and environmental degradation, whether climate change or otherwise. Many have asserted that social, economic, and political factors, like population density, poverty, and totalitarianism, work in tandem with environmental degradation to drive migration. Because of these many influencing factors, it is difficult to estimate the number displaced specifically by climate change. Nonetheless, the most commonly cited estimate is that by environmental scientist Norman Myers, who estimated that in a “green-house affected world,” around 2050, there could be 150 million climate change “refugees”[43], a number he later inflated to 200 million.[44] Their exact numbers are of no consequence to the following discussion, but it is important to note the incredible magnitude of this displacement.

The Displaced: Refugees or Migrants?

Before discussing the impacts of climate change-induced forced migration on Canadian foreign policy, it is important to briefly consider the terms involved in this debate, as various semantics imply different legal definitions, power relationships, actors, and appropriate solutions.

Those forcibly displaced by environmental degradation have been frequently referred to as “refugees”.[45] The term is used in a very literal sense, implying that “such people need to ‘seek refuge’ from the impacts of climate change,” and it is employed to emphasize the seriousness and involuntary nature of their displacement.[46] However, the term “refugee” is problematic for many reasons. First and foremost, this term is legally inapplicable to those displaced by environmental degradation because Article I of the United Nations’ Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, to which Canada subscribes[47], defines a “refugee” as a person who,

owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.[48]

As articulated by Aurelie Lopez, persecution is “an act of government against individuals”[49] and therefore only those suffering under an oppressive regime using environmental destruction to their advantage can be considered ‘refugees’.[50] As global climate change is not the result of deliberate persecution, those projected to be displaced have no legal claim to refugee status.

As expressed in the above definition, a refugee must be “outside the country of his nationality”.[51] However, the majority of those displaced by environmental factors do not fit this definition – they generally relocate regionally rather than trans-nationally.[52] Furthermore, as articulated by Oli Brown, project manager and policy researcher for the International Institute for Sustainable Development, “the concept of a ‘refugee’ implies a right of return once the persecution…has ceased,” but because of the nature of climate change-induced displacement, many, like those fleeing rising sea levels, will be unable to return.[53]

Not only is ‘refugee’ legally inaccurate, some argue that using it to describe these migrants could “dilute the available international mechanisms and goodwill to cater for existing refugees”.[54] The international refugee regime is already so overburdened by those within the UNHCR category that expanding it could result in even worse conditions for refugees generally.[55]

To avoid this problem of categorization, some have used “climate migrant,” but this presents its own problems: ‘migrants’ are associated with a high degree of agency, and this phrase emphasizes the ‘pull’ of the destination rather than the involuntary nature of their displacement.[56] Therefore, I have chosen instead the term “forced migrant,” as proposed by Oli Brown.[57] Like Brown, I use this term “in the knowledge that it is not a universally accepted term but in the hope that it conveys a reasonably accurate impression of the increasing phenomenon of non-voluntary population displacement likely as the impacts of climate change grow and accumulate”.[58] That being said, many of those referenced in this study have made different semantic choices; consequently some citations will refer to ‘refugees’ or ‘migrants’ despite my objections.

Forced Migrants and Canadian Tripartite Foreign Policy

International infrastructure for addressing forced migrants’ plight remains severely undeveloped – Oli Brown even suggests that “there is a collective, and rather successful, attempt to ignore the scale of the problem”.[59] Indeed, there is no international body to address their concerns, and aside from New Zealand, Sweden is the only country to even consider granting asylum to those fleeing environmental degradation.[60] However, despite this major lack of international attention, forced migrants are rapidly becoming a global problem. Therefore, the following will speculate about Canadian foreign policy regarding these forced migrants, by considering its three principle objectives – “the promotion of prosperity and employment; the protection of our security within a stable global framework; and the projection of Canadian values and culture”.[61] Like David R. Morrison, who used this “trinity of mixed motives” to discuss trends in overseas development assistance[62], I will break down this ‘trinity’ into humanitarian impulses, political interests, and economic goals, to demonstrate the unlikelihood of significant Canadian action.

Humanitarian Impulses

The links between humanitarian values and forced migrants are quite clear: whether fleeing from long-term drought, from rising sea levels, from natural disasters, or from resultant extreme poverty, the projected suffering of millions will likely inspire humanitarianism globally.[63] These impulses should be particularly strong, however, because ‘developed’ countries have a direct responsibility for climate change-induced mass displacement, as they bear the majority of the responsibility for global climate change.[64] The historic differences in the contributions of ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ states to climate change are well-encapsulated in the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities,” recognized by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and reaffirmed in the Convention’s 1998 Kyoto Protocol.[65] This principle places the responsibility for climate action with the ‘developed’ states.[66]

Canadian officials have a history of flaunting moral superiority both at home and abroad – presenting Canada as “a white horse in a dark world”.[67] This national self-image has been cultivated with “embarrassing enthusiasm” by many, including government officials, bureaucrats, and educational professionals.[68] A brief survey of statements by Canadian officials highlights the truth in this:

“All countries have national interests, but Canada has defined its national interest more broadly, less selfishly, than many others”.[69]

“[Canada] should be the standard by which other nations measure themselves”.[70]

“Putting people first is a foreign policy approach suited to Canadian experiences, needs, interests and capacities”.[71]

Notably, “Canadian humanitarianism” has become a foundation of national identity as well as a “point of pride held out by national representatives in international forums”.[72] This self-image has been reinforced by international recognition for humanitarian causes – for example, Canada is the only country to have received the Nansen Refugee Award, recognizing its contributions to refugee causes.[73] Ultimately then, because humanitarianism is considered to be one of the driving forces of Canadian foreign policy, one might expect Canada to take an active stance on forced migration.

That being said, a brief consideration of Canada’s particularly poor performance in the climate change regime suggests that humanitarianism has not played a role, particularly as the government continues to fail at enforcing emissions reductions. Indeed, in 2004, Canadians were among the highest per capita emitters in the world at 20 tonnes of CO2 per person, which can be contrasted against the United Kingdom’s per capita footprint of 9.8 tonnes, Japan’s of 9.9 tonnes, and Ethiopia’s 0.1 tonnes of CO2 per capita.[74] Canada has completely neglected its Kyoto targets, to the point that the UNDP singled it out as “an extreme case in point” of developed countries’ failures to reduce emissions[75]. By continuing to exacerbate the problem, Canada is perpetuating the “systematic violation of the human rights of the world’s poor and future generations”.[76]

Ultimately, it is unlikely that Canada will address forced migrants’ plight from a humanitarian perspective. Primarily, despite claims to moral superiority, Canada will likely refrain from action because this would acknowledge the country’s responsibility for climate problems. Jean Lambert, the Green Member of European Parliament for the London Region, articulated: “By recognising environmental refugees, you recognise the problem. By recognising the problem, you start on the road to accepting responsibility and implementing solutions”.[77] Canada has failed to make progress towards its Kyoto targets and even attempted to block agreements at the 2007 Bali Conference of the Parties to the Climate Change Convention[78]; these actions both suggest that the country continues to refuse to recognize its own culpability in this global problem.

More generally, Canada is unlikely to act on humanitarian impulses simply because its claims to humanitarianism are largely unfounded. Leslie Ann Jeffrey argues that Canada’s global benevolence is a “myth”[79], sentiments that are echoed by feminist Heather Smith’s work who suggests that this ‘myth’ “masks the nature of Canadian foreign policy”.[80] The discrepancy between myth and reality is well highlighted by Canada’s failure to even come close to the United Nation’s target that 0.7% of Gross National Income be given to Overseas Development Assistance (ODA).[81] Although the establishment of this target was a Canadian initiative, Canada’s 1975-76 ODA/GNI ratio of 0.53% was the highest ever achieved.[82] In 2006, despite a multi-billion dollar surplus, Canada’s ODA contribution was only 0.3% of GNI, well below the average of OECD Development Assistance Committee members.[83] With regards to climate change, several of the country’s twenty-five “Development Partners”[84] will be affected by rising sea levels or droughts in the African Sahel[85], which might attract particular Canadian ODA attention regarding forced migrants. However, through Canada’s ODA record, it is evident that the country has little claim to self-righteous moral superiority, and it is thus unlikely that humanitarian impulses will drive Canadian action.

Finally, one might suggest that because of Canada’s low population density, the country should take a humanitarian position on this issue, following New Zealand’s lead and allowing for resettlement here. However, because Canada does not grant refugee status to those suffering environmental degradation, forced migrants would be admitted only as immigrants. The Canadian immigrant selection process is driven by objectives of economic advantage[86] because the country “depends on immigration to achieve the demographic equilibrium required for economic growth and for social reproduction”[87], and therefore humanitarian impulses would not drive this resettlement. Additionally, forced migrants are generally displaced regionally rather than trans-nationally, and because Canada is so far from the regions that will be most affected, this is unlikely to ever be seriously considered.

Clearly, despite the fact that one might expect forced migrants’ suffering to inspire Canadian foreign policy’s humanitarian priorities, this is highly unlikely. Indeed, the country’s performance in the climate change regime, its tenuous claims to humanitarianism, and the improbability of resettlement in Canada, all demonstrate that it is doubtful that Canada will broach this issue from a humanitarian perspective.

Political Interests

Aside from humanitarian impulses, Canada’s foreign policy is also directed by its international political interests[88], and the political dynamics of climate change migrants are significant. Through a brief discussion of environmental security and Canada’s poor performance in the climate regime, I will demonstrate that Canadian action on this issue is unlikely.

First, Canada’s political interests will likely be affected because of forced migration’s expected impact on environmental security. The concept of environmental security considers the ways that “environmental degradation, deprivation, and resources scarcity” can interact with human security problems, ultimately contributing to instability and violence.[89] This subject has attracted much attention which, according to Roland Dannreuther, can be divided into two camps: a Malthusian argument that environmental degradation leads to social collapse and another that suggests that scarcity of key resources results in conflict.[90] Günther Baechler has suggested that regardless of their cause, environmental conflicts manifest themselves as political, social, economic, ethnic, religious or territorial conflicts.[91] Notably though, causal links between degradation and conflict must be made with caution, as environmental change is rarely the direct causes of social unrest, but rather contributes to various socioeconomic and political stressors like poverty and totalitarianism.[92]

Significantly, the United Nations Security Council also recognizes mass displacements as potential threats to international peace and security, particularly when pre-existing ethnic and social tensions are involved.[93] Astri Suhrke, Senior Researcher at the Chr. Michelsen Institute in Bergen, Norway, suggests that rural-urban flows, driven by environmental degradation, can lead to urban conglomerates becoming “centers of social unrest”.[94] Moreover, political scientist Thomas Homer-Dixon presents the Malthusian argument that increases in the scarcity of croplands and freshwater, among other necessities, will have a complex interaction with migratory flows, providing an important ‘push’ factor and resulting in conflict.[95] Indeed, he suggests that this could lead to state collapse, which could pose many political problems: “it would produce outflows of migrants” and “it would prevent the country from effectively negotiating and implementing international agreements on collective security, global environmental protection, and other matters of critical concern to the international community”.[96]

These environmental security issues are expected to be generally aggravated by climate change. As argued by a report by eleven retired American military and naval officials, climate change is a “threat multiplier for instability in some of the most volatile regions of the world,” and it will “exacerbate the problems in these regions and add to the problems of effective governance”.[97] Furthermore, the 2006 Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change projects that “increased climate variability” will result in conflicts “as work opportunities are reduced, making recruitment into rebel groups much easier”.[98]

These climate change-related problems are expected to interact in specific ways with migration, resulting in instability. For example, John Podesta and Peter Ogden forecast that as the population of Bangladesh increases and the effects of climate change set in, many will be displaced inland causing unrest in India, while others will move abroad “creating heightened political tension not only in South Asia but in Europe and Southeast Asia as well”.[99] Moreover, China, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh are expected to experience a spike in rural-to-urban migration which may lead to “urban unrest”[100], and the Stern Review forecasts that “long-term climate deterioration…will exacerbate the competition for resources [and] may contribute to forced dislocation and migration that can generate destabilizing pressures and tensions in neighbouring areas”.[101] Significantly, forced migration-induced regional conflicts may become a self-perpetuating phenomenon: migratory flows are expected to contribute to conflicts – conflicts that are projected to drive further migration.[102]

These kinds of conflicts could have significant impacts on Canadian foreign policy. For instance, conflicts are projected to occur in Bangladesh[103] and the Sahelian countries like Niger and Burkina Faso[104], which are among Canada’s major development partners. As such, major challenges will likely arise for Canadian development efforts. More generally though, it is in Canada’s political and diplomatic interests to operate in a world free of conflict and collapsed states, particularly when highly populated countries like China, an important diplomatic partner[105], are projected to experience migration-related instability. As will be demonstrated below, political instability resulting from forced displacement will probably prevent some states from fully benefiting from, or participating in, international trade.[106] Because political and economic interests are closely interlinked, this could be highly problematic for Canada.

Despite the possible implications for Canadian political interests, it is highly doubtful that the government will take a strong stance on this issue. Primarily, “Canadians have come increasingly to exaggerate the significance of their past performances in world affairs”[107]– Canada is a “middle-power”[108] and would be therefore unable to take global leadership on such a complex security issue. Indeed, because of its middle-power status, multilateralism “represents Ottawa’s primary method for the satisfaction of its foreign policy objectives”[109], and therefore Canada is unlikely to take a stance without considerable international support – support that has not materialized thus far.

Secondly, a research group from the International Institute for Sustainable Development suggests that increased conflict due to forced migration and environmental insecurity will “trigger greater demand for expensive and dangerous peacekeeping missions”.[110] Consequently, Canada would be unable to be a global leader on conflicts involving forced migration because of its diminished role in global peacekeeping missions. Indeed, Canada is nowhere among the top 20 contributors of uniformed personnel to UN peacekeeping operations, well surpassed by less ‘developed’ countries including Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Ethiopia.[111] True, Canada is the eighth highest contributor to the budget for peacekeeping operations, but these contributions are much less than those of more prominent donor countries like Japan and France, and only marginally more than others including Belgium and Greece.[112] Clearly, because of the potential importance of peacekeeping operations to the political dynamics of forced migration, Canada will be unable to take a leadership role.

Because of this unlikelihood of success, Canada should not even attempt a leadership stance on this issue – if it were to fail, it would only add to the countries’ poor performance in the climate change regime, damaging already strained diplomatic relations. Last December, Yvo de Boer, the UN climate chief, practically accused Canada of being “an environmental hypocrite” at the Bali COP last December, stating that “I personally find it interesting…to hear Canada just a little while ago indicating it would not meet its commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, and now calling on developing countries to take binding reduction targets”.[113] Beyond these allegations, the head of the German delegation felt Canada’s position at Bali was “not constructive,” and a Chinese official declared Canada and Japan to be the “most uncooperative of all countries”.[114] The international community is clearly frustrated by Canada’s environmental performance, and if the country were to renege on another climate change commitment, diplomatic ties and the country’s international image could be permanently damaged.

There are many more political dynamics of forced migration that will likely affect Canadian foreign policy. Indeed, the ways that this issue will influence immigration policy and the changing flows of ‘illegal immigrants’ are but two of countless concerns that merit attention. Nonetheless, the limited discussion above demonstrates that it is unlikely that Canada will be able to address the challenges posed by forced migrants, even though political interests of foreign policy are implicated in these problems.

Economic Goals

National economic objectives are the final ‘pillar’ of Canadian foreign policy.[115] The effects of climate change are expected to cause a complex array of regional and global economic problems which have been thoroughly considered, most notably by the Stern Review. However, despite the extensive literature on these economic impacts, there is almost nothing written about the economic consequences of forced migration. Certainly, the Stern Review focuses primarily on economic instability as a cause of migration, but does not consider migration to be a driver of this instability[116], and the recent World Bank publication, International Trade and Climate Change, contains no reference to migrants of any kind.[117]

The lack of attention is likely the result of the highly speculative nature of forced migration: long-term economic projections about such an unprecedented issue would be tenuous at best. Indeed, although there is “high agreement and much evidence” that the increases in global average temperature have been caused by anthropogenic emissions, and that this ‘global warming’ is resulting in “abrupt or irreversible” environmental changes, the extent of these changes remains unclear, as do their sociopolitical and economic consequences. [118] Moreover, a wide range of other dynamics, including varying ideologies, shifting international relations, and changing economic development, will shape the global economic landscape in unforeseeable ways. Therefore, it is nearly impossible to predict how the economic repercussions of forced migration will interact with Canadian foreign policy.

That being said, a few highly speculative projections are possible. Primarily, because forced migration is expected to contribute to environmental insecurity, and because countries that are affected by conflicts cannot fully participate in international trade[119], forced migrants could affect global markets. As such, Canada’s economic interests would be affected, particularly because some states that may suffer such insecurity, like China[120], are major Canadian trading partners[121]. Moreover, the projected disruption of regional “breadbaskets” – like Bangladesh’s Gangetic plain and Egypt’s Nile Delta– could possibly cause global shortages of staple goods. Thirdly, as suggested by Stern, it is plausible that these conflicts could result in increased involvement in “rebel groups”.[122] The problem of Somali piracy in the Gulf of Aden highlights that rebels and other ‘terrorist’ groups can pose serious obstacles to international trade[123], and therefore increased membership in such groups, motivated by the effects of forced migration, would likely contribute to global economic problems. While these economic concerns require much more attention as they become more definite, it is already evident that Canada will potentially face significant economic challenges because of the impacts of forced migrants.

However, as in the case of the humanitarian and political ‘pillars’ of foreign policy, Canada is unlikely to take major action on these economic problems. First, much of these projected challenges are rooted in political and security issues, and as previously discussed, Canada is unlikely and unable to take a leadership role on these matters. Moreover, as a ‘middle-power,’ Canada has little sway over the global economy and therefore would have to rely on foreign leadership. Most significantly, because these unprecedented economic implications are so speculative, it is unlikely that Canada will take any major actions until the situation becomes much more certain, which may be well after forced migration is already a major global phenomenon. Generally then, it is highly doubtful that Canada will choose to take an active foreign policy stance on the economic issues created by forced migrants.

Addressing the Root of the Problem:

Canada’s UNFCC Commitments

This paper has painted a bleak picture of Canadian action, demonstrating that the government is unlikely to take a stance on forced migration from any of the ‘pillars’ driving its foreign policy. However, while Canada has little hope of directly tackling this issue, a more feasible course of action would be for the country to attempt to address the actual root causes of the problem. Indeed, it would be more effective for Canada to fulfill its commitments to the UNFCC[124], contributing to mitigation and adaptation efforts to indirectly minimizing the possible volume of forced migrants.

The emissions scenarios forecast by the IPCC remain speculative and the actual increases in global average temperature will be determined, in part, by mitigative actions taken in the next few years.[125] The severity of climate change and the threat of mass displacement will depend on the extent of this global warming – for example, as projected by the Stern Review, a global increase of only 2º would result in roughly 10 million more people being affected by coastal flooding annually, while a 4º increase would expose 7 to 300 million more to this problem.[126] By actually committing to mitigation strategies, Canada would not only improve its damaged environmental reputation, but would also help minimize the number of future forced migrants.  Furthermore, Canada could also play an important role in helping increase the adaptive capacities of the most threatened regions. Some of these states are already among Canada’s major development recipients[127], and by maintaining a focus on these partners, Canada could help diminish the possibility of degradation-induced displacement.

Although it is doubtful that Canada will directly address forced migration through its foreign policy interests, by fulfilling its prior commitments to mitigation and adaptation, the country could still indirectly broach this problem. Unfortunately, as evidenced by the disparaging comments about Canada’s behaviour at the 2007 Bali Conference, these commitments have yet to be kept.[128]

Conclusions

The plight of the Yup’ik Inuit, the Maldivians, the Tuvaluans, and the Carteret islanders are but glimpses of the mass displacement expected to come. Indeed, the rising global average temperature is projected to increase the incidences of natural disasters[129], temporarily forcing the migration of many, and to cause slow-onset processes like rising sea levels and desertification, permanently displacing millions.[130] Significantly, it is predicted that this forced migration will seriously impede the success of the Millennium Development Goals.[131] However, despite the seriousness of these consequences, this problem has received remarkably minimal international attention and there remains no established international infrastructure to address it.

As a member of the global community, forced migration will also affect Canada and its foreign policy interests. However, by examining these impacts through the three ‘pillars’ driving foreign policy – humanitarian impulses, political interests, and economic objectives – I have demonstrated that Canada is both unlikely and unable to take strong action on these issues. Factors including Canada’s poor performance in the climate change regime, its actions on a variety of foreign policy issues including peacekeeping and ODA, and its international status as a political and economic middle-power, all contribute to the unlikelihood of Canadian action on forced migration. Ultimately, rather than independent foreign policy action, Canada’s should instead abide by its commitments to the UNFCCC, addressing the problem at its roots through mitigation and adaptation measures.

This study has been significantly limited by the speculative nature of the debate about climate change and its impacts on migratory flows. As these complex problems unfold and their impacts on Canada and the international community become more certain, it is critical that this issue be reconsidered in much more detail. Indeed, it must be further examined because although this issue has become “a game of political pass-the-parcel” as “no one wants to be left holding the problem of [forced migrants]”[132], inaction will eventually cease to be an option, and a global response will become absolutely necessary.

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Lopez, Aurelie. “The protection of environmentally-displaced persons in international law.” Environmental Law 37.2: 365-410. 2007.

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Traynor, Ian. “EU told to prepare for flood of climate change migrants.” The Guardian. 10 March, 2008. Guardian News and Media Limited. http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/mar/10/climatechange.eu.

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York, Geoffrey. “Isolated Canada Grudgingly Excepts Bali Deal.” The Globe and Mail. December 15. CTVGlobemedia Publishing Inc. 2007. http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20071215.wbalidealyork1215/BNStory/International/home.


[1] IPCC. “Summary for Policymakers.” In Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 2007a http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf. 13.

[2] IPCC. “Summary for Policymakers.” In Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Edited by Solomon, S., D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K.B. Averyt, M.Tignor and H.L. Miller. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2007b. http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-spm.pdf. 5.

[3] The International Panel on Climate Change estimates suggest an increase of 2 to 4.5ºC by 2100, estimating that it is “very unlikely” that the global average temperature will rise by less than 1.5°C by 2100 (IPCC 2007b:12).

[4] UNDP. “Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World.” Human Development Report 2007/2008. United Nations Development Programme. 2007. http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr_20072008_en_complete.pdf. 43-5. Nicholas Stern. “Part II: Impacts of climate change on growth and development (Chapters 3-6).” Stern Review Report on the Economics of Climate Change. (New York: Cambridge University Press.  2006.) 20-40.

[5] IPCC. “Summary for Policymakers.” In Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report. Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 2001. http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/climate-changes-2001/synthesis-spm/synthesis-spm-en.pdf. 12.

[6] Oli Brown. “Climate change and forced migration: Observations, projections and implications.” Human Development Report Occasional Paper. Geneva: International Institute for Sustainable Development. 2007. 12.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Norman Myers. “Environmental Refugees: A Growing Phenomenon of the 21st Century.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society: Biological Sciences 357.1420: 609-613. 2002.

[9] Ibid. 609.

[10] Oli Brown. “Climate change and forced migration: Observations, projections and implications.” 11.

[11] Ed Pilkington. “The Village at the Tip of the Iceberg.” The Guardian. 28 September, 2008.  Guardian News and Media Limited. http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/mar/10/climatechange.eu.

[12] Fabrice Renaud, Janos J. Bogardi, Olivia Dun, and Koko Warner. Control, Adapt or Flee: How to Face Environmental Migration? Intersections: Interdisicplinary Security ConnecTions. Bonn, Germany: United Nations University, Institute for Environment and Human Security. 2007. 20.

[13] Oli Brown. “Climate change and forced migration: Observations, projections and implications.” 18.

[14] UNDP. “Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World.”

[15] Nicholas Stern. “Part II: Impacts of climate change on growth and development.” 7.

[16] Ibid.

[17] UNDP. “Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World.” 17.

[18] Ibid. 99; 105-6.

[19] Nicholas Stern. “Part II: Impacts of climate change on growth and development.” 7.

[20] IPCC. “Summary for Policymakers.” 2007b. 12.

[21] UNDP. “Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World.” 75-6.

[22] SCN. “5th Report on the World Nutrition Situation: Nutrition for Improved Development Outcomes.” Standing Committee on Nutrition, United Nations System. 2004. http://www.unsystem.org/scn/publications/AnnualMeeting/SCN31/SCN5Report.pdf. 5-24., Nicholas Stern. “Part II: Impacts of climate change on growth and development.” 7., UNDP. “Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World.” 1.

[23] Ibid. 1.

[24] Oli Brown. “Climate change and forced migration: Observations, projections and implications.” 2.

[25] Jean  Lambert. “Refugees and the Environment: The Forgotten Element of Sustainability.” The Greens/European Free Alliance in the European Parliament. Brussels: European Parliament. 2002. http://www.jeanlambertmep.org.uk/DocumentStore/0206Ref_Env_Rep.pdf. 3-4., Steve Lonergan. “The Role of Environmental Degradation in Population Displacement.” Environmental Change and Security Project Report 4: 5-15. 1995. 7.

[26] Oli Brown. “Climate change and forced migration: Observations, projections and implications.” 11.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid. 10.

[29] Ibid. 9., IPCC. “Summary for Policymakers.” In Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Edited by M.L. Parry, O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden and C.E. Hanson. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 2007c. http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-spm.pdf. 13.

[30] Oli Brown. “Climate change and forced migration: Observations, projections and implications.” 14.

[31] Ibid. 9.

[32] Ibid. 11.

[33] Aurelie Lopez. “The protection of environmentally-displaced persons in international law.” Environmental Law 37.2: 365-410. 2007. 372.

[34] Ibid., John Podesta  and Peter Ogden. “The Security Implications of Climate Change.” The Washington Quarterly 31.1: 115-138. 2007. 117-8.

[35] Oli Brown. “Climate change and forced migration: Observations, projections and implications.” 18.

[36] Jon Henley. 2008. “The Last Days of Paradise.” The Guardian. (Guardian News and Media Limited. 2008.) http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/nov/11/climatechange-endangered-habitats-maldives.

[37] Fabrice Renaud et al. Control, Adapt or Flee: How to Face Environmental Migration? 20.

[38] Oli Brown. “Climate change and forced migration: Observations, projections and implications.” 18.

[39] Jon Henley. 2008. “The Last Days of Paradise.”

[40] This relocation is only open to those aged 18 to 45 and is through New Zealand’s Pacific Access Category. This programme is also open to citizens of Tonga, Kiribati, and Fiji, and it is a “labour migration programme” and has not been implemented specifically for Tuvaluans threatened by rising sea levels.

Fabrice Renaud et al. Control, Adapt or Flee: How to Face Environmental Migration? 20.

[41] At this rate, it would take 140 years to relocate the Tuvalu population, yet scientists hypothesize, however, that the island will be completely submerged within ninety years.

Aurelie Lopez. “The protection of environmentally-displaced persons in international law.” 372-3.

[42] Oli Brown. “Climate change and forced migration: Observations, projections and implications.” 10.

[43] Norman Myers. “Environmental Refugees in a Globally Warmed World.” BioScience 43.11: 752-62. 1993. 757.

[44] Norman Myers. “Environmental Refugees: A Growing Phenomenon of the 21st Century.” 609.

[45] Jean  Lambert. “Refugees and the Environment: The Forgotten Element of Sustainability.”, Steve Lonergan. “The Role of Environmental Degradation in Population Displacement.”, Norman Myers. “Environmental Refugees in a Globally Warmed World.”, Alan E. Nash. “Environmental Refugees: Consequences and Policies from a Western Perspective.” Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 3: 227-238. 1999., Fabrice Renaud et al. Control, Adapt or Flee: How to Face Environmental Migration?, Astri Suhrke. “Environmental degradation and population flows.” Journal of International Affairs 47.2: 473-496. 1994., Evan Vlachos. “Environmental Refugees: The Growing Challenge.” Conflict and the Environment, edited by Nils Petter Gleditsch. (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 293-312. 1997.), Arthur H. Westing. “Environmental Refugees: A Growing Category of Displaced Persons.” Environmental Conservation 19: 201-207. 1992.

[46] Oli Brown. “Climate change and forced migration: Observations, projections and implications.” 7.

[47] CIC (Citizenship and Immigration Canada). “Refugee claims in Canada—Who can apply.” Citizenship and Immigration Canada. 2008.

[48] UNHCR. Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. Geneva: The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 2007. http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b66c2aa10.pdf.

[49] Aurelie Lopez. “The protection of environmentally-displaced persons in international law.” 378.

[50] Examples of these ‘refugees’ could include those affected by US use of Agent Orange during the Vietnam War, those who cannot be repatriated because of landmines, or the Marsh Arabs who suffered persecution by the Iraqi Government between 1991 and 1997.

Ibid. 345-6.

[51] UNHCR. Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.

[52] John Podesta  and Peter Ogden. “The Security Implications of Climate Change.”

[53] Oli Brown, Alec Crawford and Christine Campeau. “Environmental Change and the New Security Agenda: Implications for Canada’s security and environment.” Geneva: International Institute for Sustainable Development. 2008. 7.

[54] Oli Brown. “Climate change and forced migration: Observations, projections and implications.” 8.

[55] Ibid., Gil Loedscher. “The international refugee regime: Stretched to the limit?” Journal of International Affairs 47.2: 351-377. 1994.

[56] Ian Traynor. “EU told to prepare for flood of climate change migrants.” The Guardian. 10 March, 2008. Guardian News and Media Limited. http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/mar/10/climatechange.eu., Elisabeth Meze-Hausken. “Migration Caused by Climate Change: How Vulnerable Are People in Dryland Areas?”  Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 5: 379–406. 2000.

[57] Oli Brown. “Climate change and forced migration: Observations, projections and implications.” 8.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Ibid. 27.

[60] Ibid.

[61] Ann Denholm Crosby. “Myths of Canada’s Human Security Pursuits: Tales of Tool Boxes, Toy Chests, and Tickle Trunks.” In Feminist Perspectives on Canadian Foreign Policy, 90-107. Edited by C. Turenne Sjolander, H.A. Smith and D. Steinstra. (Toronto: Oxford. 2003.) 94.

[62] David R. Morrison. Aid and Ebb Tide: A History of CIDA and Canadian Development Assistance. (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier Press. 1998.) 12-6.

[63] Norman Myers. “Environmental Refugees: A Growing Phenomenon of the 21st Century.”

[64] The extreme disparity in these contributions are well highlighted by the fact that “if every person living in the developing world had the same carbon footprint as the average for high income countries, global CO2 emissions would rise to 85 gigatonnes of CO2—a level that would require six planets.”

UNDP. “Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World.” 48.

[65] United Nations. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 1992. http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf., United Nations. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 1998. http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.

[66] Christopher D. Stone. “Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law.” The American Journal of International Law 98.2: 276-301. 2004.  276-7.

[67] Leslie Ann Jeffrey “Canada and Migrant Sex-Work: Challenging the ‘Foreign’ in Foreign Policy.” Canadian Foreign Policy, 12.1: 33-48. 2005. 39.

[68] Denis Stairs. “Trends in Canadian Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future,” Behind the Headlines 59.3:1-7. 2002. 1.

[69] Former Minister of External Affairs, Joe Clark, 1997, as cited in Heather A. Smith “Disrupting Internationalism and Finding the Others.” In Feminist Perspectives on Canadian Foreign Policy, edited by Claire Turenne Sjolander, Heather A. Smith and Deborah Stienstra. (Toronto: Oxford University Press. 24-39. 2003.) 24.

[70] Paul Martin. “Speech by the Honourable Paul Martin, P.C., M.P. Minister of Finance.” Department of Finance Canada. 2000. http://www.fin.gc.ca/ec2000/speeche.htm.

[71] Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy 2000 as cited in Heather A. Smith “Disrupting Internationalism and Finding the Others.” 24.

[72] Catherine Dauvergne. Humanitarianism, Identity, and Nation: Migration Laws in Canada and Australia. (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press. 2005.) 49, 130.

[73] Isabel Kaprielian-Churchill. “Rejecting ‘Misfits:’ Canada and the Nansen Passport.” International Migration Review 28.2: 281-306. 1994. 281.

[74] UNDP. “Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World.” 310-3.

[75] Through the Kyoto Protocol, Canada agreed to target a 6 percent cut in emissions of 1990 emissions, however these emissions have increased by 27 percent.

Ibid. 10.

[76] Ibid. 4.

[77] Jean  Lambert. “Refugees and the Environment: The Forgotten Element of Sustainability.” 1.

[78] Geoffrey York. “Isolated Canada Grudgingly Excepts Bali Deal.” The Globe and Mail. December 15. CTVGlobemedia Publishing Inc. 2007. http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20071215.wbalidealyork1215/BNStory/International/home.

[79] Leslie Ann Jeffrey “Canada and Migrant Sex-Work: Challenging the ‘Foreign’ in Foreign Policy.” 39.

[80] Heather A. Smith “Disrupting Internationalism and Finding the Others.” 24.

[81] UNICEF. “0.7% Background.” United Nations Children’s Funds. 2007. http://www.unicef.ca/portal/Secure/Community/502/WCM/HELP/take_action/G8/Point7_EN2.pdf. 1.

[82] David R. Morrison. Aid and Ebb Tide: A History of CIDA and Canadian Development Assistance. (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier Press. 1998.) 16.

[83] UNICEF. “0.7% Background.” 12.

[84] Marcus Pistor. “Canadian International Development Agency’s 25 Development Partners.” Ottawa: Parliamentary Information and Research Service, Political and Social Affairs Division. 2005. http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/PRB-e/PRB0504-e.pdf. 3.

[85] Oli Brown, Alec Crawford and Christine Campeau. “Environmental Change and the New Security Agenda: Implications for Canada’s security and environment.” 11.

[86] Christina Gabriel. “Charting Canadian Immigration Policy in the New Millennium.” In Canada Among Nations, 2006: Minorities and Priorities, edited by Andrew F. Cooper and Dane Rowlands. (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. 187-208. 2006.) 191-2.

[87] Audrey Macklin. “Public Entrance/Private Member.” In Privatization, Law, and the Challenge to Feminism, edited by Brenda Crossman and Judy Fudge. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 218-264. 2002.) 218.

[88] David R. Morrison. Aid and Ebb Tide: A History of CIDA and Canadian Development Assistance. (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier Press. 1998.) 14-5.

[89] P.H. Liotta. “The Uncertain Certainty: Environmental Stress Indicators and the Euro-Mediterranean Space.” Mediterranean Quarterly 14.2: 21-45. 2003. 24.

[90] Roland Dannreuther. International Security: The Contemporary Agenda. (Malden, MA: Polity Press. 2007.) 66.

[91] Günther Baechler. “Why Environmental Transformation Causes Violence” Environmental Change and Security Project Report 4: 24-44. 1998.  24.

[92] Ibid. 27.

[93] Oli Brown. “Climate change and forced migration: Observations, projections and implications.” 24.

[94] Astri Suhrke. “Environmental Degradation, Migration, and the Potential for Conflict.” Conflict and the Environment, edited by Nils Petter Gleditsch. (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 255-272. 1997.) 258.

[95] Thomas F. Homer-Dixon. Environment, Scarcity, and Violence. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1999.) 63-9, 93-6, 136-48, 166-70.

[96] Ibid. 167.

[97] Gordon R. Sullivan, Frank Bowman, Lawrence P. Farrell Jr., Paul G. Gaffney II, Paul J. Kern, T. Joseph Lopez, Donald L. Pilling, Joseph W. Prueher, Richard H. Truly, Charles F. Wald and Anthony C. Zinni. National Security and the Threat of Climate Change. Alexandria, VA: Centre for Naval Analysis. 2007. http://securityandclimate.cna.org/report/National%20Security%20and%20the%20Threat%20of%20Climate%20Change.pdf. 3.

[98] Nicholas Stern. “Part II: Impacts of climate change on growth and development.” 112.

[99] John Podesta  and Peter Ogden. “The Security Implications of Climate Change.” 117.

[100] IPCC. “Chapter 10: Asia.” In Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Edited by M.L. Parry, O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden and C.E. Hanson. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. 469-506. 2007d. http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter10.pdf 488.

[101] Nicholas Stern. “Part II: Impacts of climate change on growth and development.” 112.

[102] IPCC. “Chapter 10: Asia.” 488.

[103] Thomas F. Homer-Dixon. Environment, Scarcity, and Violence. 17-8.

[104] Steve Lonergan. “The Role of Environmental Degradation in Population Displacement.” 10-1.

[105] Ontario. “Canada’s Main Trading Partners – 2006.” The Government of Ontario. 2006. http://www.2ontario.com/welcome/coca_401.asp.

[106] Hilary Benn. “Trade and Security in an Interconnected World.” In Human and Environmental Security: An Agenda for Change, edited by Felix Dodds and Tim Pippard. Sterling, VA: Earthscan. 92-103. 2005. 94-6.

[107] Denis Stairs. “Trends in Canadian Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future,” 1.

[108] David R. Morrison. Aid and Ebb Tide: A History of CIDA and Canadian Development Assistance. (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier Press. 1998.) 20.

[109] Costas Melakopides. “Pragmatic Idealism: Canadian Foreign Policy 1945-1995.” (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press. 1998.) 5.

[110] Oli Brown, Alec Crawford and Christine Campeau. “Environmental Change and the New Security Agenda: Implications for Canada’s security and environment.” 18.

[111] United Nations. “Factsheet: United Nations Peacekeeping.” United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and United Nations Department of Public Information. 2008. http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/factsheet.pdf. 8.

[112] Ibid.

[113] de Boer as cited in Alexander Panetta. “Canada assailed from all sides at climate talks.” The Toronto Star. December 10, 2007. http://www.thestar.com/News/article/284178.

[114] Ibid source.

[115] Ann Denholm Crosby. “Myths of Canada’s Human Security Pursuits: Tales of Tool Boxes, Toy Chests, and Tickle Trunks.”, David R. Morrison. Aid and Ebb Tide: A History of CIDA and Canadian Development Assistance. (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier Press. 1998.)

[116] Nicholas Stern. “Part II: Impacts of climate change on growth and development.”  111-2.

[117] World Bank. International Trade and Climate Change: Economic, Legal and Institutional Perspectives. Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank. 2008. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPUB/3876078-1192582946896/21513448/ITCC_ Booklet_rev2.pdf.

[118] IPCC. “Summary for Policymakers.” 2007a. 8-9, 11-3.

[119] Hilary Benn. “Trade and Security in an Interconnected World.” In Human and Environmental Security: An Agenda for Change, edited by Felix Dodds and Tim Pippard. Sterling, VA: Earthscan. 92-103. 2005. 94-6.

[120] Nicholas Stern. “Part II: Impacts of climate change on growth and development.”

[121] Ontario. “Canada’s Main Trading Partners – 2006.”

[122] Nicholas Stern. “Part II: Impacts of climate change on growth and development.” 112.

[123]Roger Middleton. Piracy in Somalia: Threatening Global Trade, Feeding Local Wars. Chatham House briefing paper. 2008. http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/12203_1008piracysomalia.pdf. 9-10

[124] United Nations. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 6, 8.

[125] IPCC. “Summary for Policymakers.” 2007a. 7-8.

[126] Nicholas Stern. “Part II: Impacts of climate change on growth and development.” 7.

[127] Marcus Pistor. “Canadian International Development Agency’s 25 Development Partners.” 3.

[128] Alexander Panetta. “Canada assailed from all sides at climate talks.” 8.

[129] IPCC. “Summary for Policymakers.” 2007b. 5.

[130] Norman Myers. “Environmental Refugees in a Globally Warmed World.” 12.

[131] SCN. “5th Report on the World Nutrition Situation: Nutrition for Improved Development Outcomes.”

[132] Andrew Simms as cited in Megan Rowling. “Climate Refugees in Political Pass-the-Parcel.” AlterNet. 13 May 2008. Reuters Foundation. 2008. http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L10842290.htm.

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