Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding:

Canada’s New Role in

Building Capacity Abroad

Allison Sephton

Many things have changed in the world since 1989. Global power is no longer defined in terms of military strength and ideological alliances with a dominant superpower. The bipolar stability has been shattered, making the world a considerably less secure place. Today, wars are fought not only between states, but within them. Conflicts are fought over ethnic, religious, and economic divisions and not only between militaries, but amongst civilians as well. The post-Cold War era is marked by increasing threats to human security as failed states are ever-increasing in number. The world’s wealthiest countries no longer have vested interests in helping these states build the capacity to restore, and more importantly to maintain, peace. During the Cold War, Canada was seen as an influential middle power and an effective multilateral actor, with a strong record of peacekeeping. However, over the past decade, the global human security agenda has shifted its focus from pure militaristic peacekeeping to encompass more holistic peacebuilding processes, which focus on political and socioeconomic (rather than militaristic) ways to build human security within a state, focusing on democratic governance, human rights, the rule of law, sustainable development and environmental protection. [1] The advent of the Responsibility to Protect in 2001 (which was largely sponsored by the Canadian government) is bringing the debate between sovereignty and humanitarian intervention to the forefront, as the world community is placing increasing value on the protection of human rights over the protection of self-determination. The Honourable Lloyd Axworthy made clear that a new foreign policy paradigm is needed for human security. [2]

Given its extensive experience as a globally-recognized competent peacekeeping country, Canada should continue to devote its (currently fewer) resources to militaristic, UN-sponsored peacekeeping operations (PKOs). This paper will examine Canada’s historical evolution of peacekeeping to exemplify Canada’s militaristic and multilateral strengths, and also to bring to light some of the problems and debates behind peacekeeping that bear weight on international attitudes towards humanitarian intervention today. The focus will then turn to how, given the new global context surrounding human security, Canada should also explore more creative and comprehensive avenues of involving international organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector in the peacebuilding process. Military involvement can now be combined with new strategies, such as soft power. Furthermore, Canada should commit to building capacity in failed states post-conflict – that is, helping to build the economic, social and political bridges that will maintain peace and garner the stability that will ensure enduring peace in these states.

However, a more vivid picture of the current world order needs to be painted before further discussion of the issues at hand. In 1994, in his famous essay “The Coming Anarchy,” Robert Kaplan predicted that the end of the Cold War would result in the proliferation of anarchic regionalisms. As client states of the rivaling superpowers, these countries were given economic and military assistance in return for their alliance. Now, as “failed states” in the developing world, they have been left behind to inevitably experience the “withering away of central government, the rise of tribal and regional domains, the unchecked spread of disease and the growing pervasiveness of war.” [3] Human security no longer means merely ending military conflict – issues of economic crisis, political instability, hunger, and disease can prove to be just as deadly as war. The effects of underdevelopment are threefold in conflict, as they tend to be precursors to civil and regional conflict, they are exacerbated during the violence, and they are an impediment to state rebuilding after the violence has ended. While militaristic humanitarian intervention from the international community still plays a vital role in ending the violence, development assistance is critical in preventing further conflict and rebuilding societies after the fighting has ended. [4]

Due to this changing world order, traditional peacekeeping methods need to be revamped. According to the Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, peacekeeping is “an activity engaged in by military and/or civilian actors operating in a neutral and impartial way, with the consent of the parties and using force strictly in self-defense: the object being the cessation of violence…and assisting in the establishment of a truce or cease-fire.” [5] The United Nations began engaging in peacekeeping activities (called “preventative diplomacy”) [6] in the 1950s, specifically with the Suez crisis of 1956. The concept of peacekeeping was actually invented by Canadian Foreign Affairs minister Lester Pearson, when he pushed for global involvement in the withdrawal of troops in the Suez crisis. [7] This initiative ultimately made peacekeeping an international concern, with many countries acting multilaterally in larger initiatives than ever before to end violence in conflict-ridden areas outside of their jurisdiction. [8]

The United Nations then became the primary vehicle for organizing and financing peacekeeping operations (PKOs). [9] During the Cold War, the UN facilitated 13 PKOs in countries with long-term conflict. [10] All of these classical PKOs were multilateral acts that were primarily military-based and dependent on volunteer national capacity. They were “a unique expression of the operation of political will… [Reflecting] the ideals and the habits of the cooperation traditional to the international community, and particularly to the UN.” [11] It would be naïve, however, to assume that these states were acting altruistically. As realist theory dictates, states act in self-interest. This was especially evident during the Cold War when the US and Soviet Union were desperately trying to garner allies. In his essay “Peacekeeping: Did Canada Make a Difference?,” Granatstein states in regards to peacekeeping that “while it often served US interests…it nonetheless had about it a powerful aura of independence and the implicit sense that it served higher interests than simply those of the US, or even the West.” [12] This obviously leads one to believe that perhaps there was general concern for promoting human security at the international level. It should also be remembered that the international system had just emerged from two great wars; states realized that “isolation was no guarantee of safety in the modern world and that isolationism as a doctrine was equivalent to fool’s gold.” [13]

Canada’s role in peacekeeping during the Cold War was significant. Granatstein asserts that “if there is any one area of foreign policy and defense policy in which Canada did unquestionably make a difference, it is surely the area of peacekeeping.” [14] As a “middle power” during the Cold War, Canada had “room to maneuver with respect to constructive endeavor in a changing international context.” [15] Beginning with Lester Pearson, Canada pushed the importance of peacekeeping on the international stage, and was involved in several PKOs, such as the ones in Congo (1960) and Cyprus (1964), for example. [16] Canada was considered to be a strong and effective multilateral actor, pushing for human rights and global democracy through its involvement in the UN as well as other multilateral institutions such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Organization of American States (OAS). [17] Oran Young alleged that Canada was an exemplar of “entrepreneurial” and “technical” leadership in the multilateral arena. [18 ] Canada’s dedication to UN peacekeeping efforts was consistent due to the fact that, according to James Eayrs, “Canada came of age internationally at the time the United Nations was forming.” [19] Thus, it was quite natural that Canada “incorporated an identity of purpose between itself and the UN into the definition of its foreign policy.” [20]

Now that the Cold War is over, the nature of peacekeeping is changing as new patterns of global conflict emerge. It is now recognized that military intervention alone is no longer sufficient – capacity building is required to maintain peace and order. Every regional conflict requires a tailored response linking objective with local context and local and global capacity. [21] Strategies need to be three-dimensional and address the local roots of conflict, the capacities for change in the local context, and finally the degree to which international commitment is available to assist sustainable peace. [22] The UN has renewed its multilateral efforts and PKOs have increased in number, scope and domain. From 1988 to 1997 there have been 28 new operations, including Cambodia, Namibia, Angola, parts of Central America, Liberia, Rwanda, Yugoslavia, Somalia and the Persian Gulf Region. [23]

These new PKOs have differed greatly from their pre-1989 predecessors. In the new era of human security, a PKO needs the consent of the permanent members of the Security Council as well as military resources to deal with civilian security in addition to other traditional areas of concern. As opposed to being neutral, peacekeepers (whether military or civilian) have an impartial mandate to observe, engage and enforce peace. They also create and sustain new behaviour and institutions – but are never neutral. [24] UN peacekeepers now find themselves performing capacity building tasks beyond their traditional mandates, as new missions included stability, protection, human rights, justice, and development. [25]

In a study done by Doyle and Sambanis (2000), it was found that multilateral, United Nations peace operations make a positive difference in ending civil wars. It was also found that the UN peacekeeping efforts were positively linked to the democratization process after a civil war, and that the multilateral enforcement operations are typically successful at ending the violence. [26]

Obviously, UN PKOs should continue. Now, the UN might actually be able to engage in more assertive humanitarian intervention, because since the Cold War is over, there is greater potential for consensus among member states. Globalization means that many social, economic and political problems are defying national solutions, and multilateral action might be the only way to rectify these issues. [27] States are openly supporting humanitarian intervention abroad, recognizing that human security transcends borders and traditional competencies within governments. [28]

Multilateralism is still held in the utmost regard, and more than ever, coordination between the UN and member states is important. However, effective coordination between these groups is beyond the existing capabilities of the UN. [29] The UN is only as good as the government resources that are committed to it. The UN Security Council is still governed by the interests of member governments, who might not necessarily have vested interests in helping failed states. [30] Yet, “despite how quickly the concept has been validated, getting states to practice human security is a difficult and uneven process.” Governments are spouting a lot of rhetoric without providing concrete action. Ambitions for peacekeeping are growing, and the resources required are harder and harder to come by. [32] The fact that humanitarian intervention is posing increasing financial, political and institutional risks on the actor states is another deterrent to commitment. [33] [34] The problem of governments still not enacting at home what they support at the UN continues. [35] The result has been “a system too frequently unprepared and unwilling to act.” [36] According to Fortier, by 1995, the UN had no money and appeared to be shirking its role in the promotion of international peace and security. “The UN Security Council would retain its broad authorizing role, including the use of force by non-UN multinational forces, but would revert operationally to what it knew best – modest UN blue beret mission based on Chapter VI of its charter [37].” [38]

Rwanda exemplifies the trend the UN’s diminishing peacekeeping capacity. In 1994, ethnic conflict resulted in a genocide that killed almost 800,000 Rwandan civilians. The UN sent in a PKO, UNAMIR (United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda) led by Canadian Lieutenant-General Romeo Dallaire. The mission was an ultimate failure: multilateral action was unable to end the conflict and protect human security. In his book Shake Hands with the Devil, Dallaire blames the demise of the mission on UN bureaucratic inefficiency, combined with the failure of key member states to recognize the danger of the conflict, reach a consensus on a course of action, and provide key resources to the mission (in the form of troops, funding and equipment). He blamed the international community for not responding quickly to the scenario as well as the media for not stimulating the global motivation to get involved. [39] While some claim Dallaire lacked the competency required for carrying out the task, the majority of foreign policy critics agree that the failure of the mission was not his fault. They believe that “Dallaire commanded his inadequate UN forces in face of political apathy and genocidal horror.” [40]

The UN has tried to avoid such issues by creating smaller autonomous agencies independent of governments, for example the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). Such agencies have proven to be much more effective in global capacity building, but are less accountable to the governments of UN member states. [41] Sewell affirms that “the UN has become more effective without necessarily becoming more accountable…of late, the UN has witnessed stalemate; now it often attends decisive action.” [42] It has also been found that once the Security Council backs out of a PKO, humanitarian workers tend to back out as well. The result is a temporary end to conflict without the resources and institutions needed to sustain the peace. [43]

Another dominant issue in peacekeeping has been that of sovereignty. Increased multilateralism means that the nature of peacekeeping is becoming more intrusive on national sovereignty. [44] The nature of peacekeeping itself has always been in conflict with the right of a sovereign state to deal with its problems independently – a right upholding the entire organization of the international system. But most international actors have legitimized the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), which asserts that individuals’ rights are just as important as states’. [45] Vaclav Havel eloquently states that “the sovereignty of the community, the region, the nation, the state…makes sense only if it is derived from the one genuine sovereignty – that is, from the sovereignty of the individual.” [46]

In 2000, Canada helped to establish the independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), whose mandate was to attempt to reconcile the conflict between sovereignty and humanitarian intervention among the international community, and to garner a global consensus on how to deal with the inefficiencies within the UN system that were hindering effective humanitarian action. [47] The wide range of members on the Commission presented The Responsibility to Protect to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in 2001, which called for a shift in thinking from the “right to intervene” (which was associated with military activity) to the “responsibility to protect,” which would bring about “a shift from a culture of sovereign impunity to one of national and international accountability.” [48] Gareth and Sahnoun (the co-Chairs of the ICISS) speak of a new dual responsibility of sovereignty, which includes not only respecting the sovereignty of external states, but also respecting the internal sovereignty of people within a country to enjoy basic human rights. If a state is not respecting internal sovereignty, it is the responsibility of the international community to intervene for humanitarian reasons. The ICISS use a “just cause” threshold for military intervention, meaning it can only be used under exceptional circumstances if there is an actual or anticipated large-scale loss of life, or an actual or anticipated large-scale “ethnic cleansing.” They also believe that that UN is “unquestionably the principal institution for building, consolidating, and using the authority of the international community.” [49] Like others, they recognized the lack of political will among the permanent members of the Security Council (for this, they called for them to revoke their veto power when humanitarian intervention is involved) and contributing member states, and the lack of human and financial resources available.

The Responsibility to Protect also spoke of a threefold responsibility, including the responsibilities to “prevent,” “react,” and “rebuild.” [50] This is where non-military measures under the umbrella of peacebuilding become crucial in the long-term maintenance of peace, and how building capacity in the political, economic and environmental sectors is key to preventing future internal strife. Canada is still very much seen as an influential middle power in international relations, and as evidenced by our founding role in the ICISS, we still show a strong commitment to the human security agenda. Our history proves that we are an effective peacekeeping nation (it has even been a source of national pride), however recent cutbacks to the defense budget have somewhat diminished our peacekeeping capacities. Canada is still valued globally for its “anti-military military role” in peacekeeping, and for this reason we should continue our commitment to UN PKOs. [51] But the world is changing, and with the widening international agenda, Canada’s foreign policy needs dynamism and improvisation. [52]

Canada needs to explore other options where it can have influence besides peacekeeping. Lloyd Axworthy maintains that “the best Canadian foreign policy remains an independent policy based on our competences and capacity to deliver…the human security agenda is a basis for a new way forward.” [53] Canada, then, can also build capacity in war-stricken areas by adopting a more encompassing, comprehensive approach through the engagement of other actors such as intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the media, civil society and the private sector. Canada can also use soft power to enact global change.

Even though militaristic responses can be effective in peacebuilding, they are falling out of favour with the Canadian government. Soft power is today perhaps more effective in influencing global patterns than ever before. Created by Joseph Nye, the term “soft power” refers to exerting influence through economic and cultural means rather than through military ends, or “hard power.” [54] Axworthy elaborates by saying that “’soft power’ relies on diplomatic resources, persuasion, information capacity, and creative use of selective military tools rather than coercive force to promote a country’s interests or project its influence on the world stage.” [55] Perhaps soft power can enhance Canada’s ability to be an effective capacity builder, and is a more viable option for the pursuit of its interests in the human security agenda.

Involving non-state actors is an effective way for the Canadian government to use soft power to achieve a well-rounded peacebuilding approach. [56] Axworthy speaks of the “internationalization of conscience,” and says that “these organizations usually have greater leeway than states to speak out and take action, and are, therefore, more able to push specific agenda.” The dialogues needs to be broadened across these actors, and “advancing human security is also the reason for developing innovative global partnership linking like-minded countries, institutions, and NGOs. Such coalitions between governments and civil society are harbingers of the future, demonstrating the power of noble intent, good ideas, and pooled resources.” [57] Sewell and Cooper both also point out that engaging these other actors closes the accountability gap and legitimizes relations between the state and society. [58]

NGOs are becoming more active in capacity building today then ever before. The Canadian government is in some cases bringing non-state actors into the foreign policy process, giving NGOs (like CIDA, OXFAM, CUSO, MATCH) an enhanced status. [59] The Canadian government also has technical and administration reasons for pulling NGOs on board, as they can make up for budget constraints, decentralization, and privatization. [60] Peaceful governance requires strong state institutions, broader political participation, land reform, a deepening of civil society, and respect for ethnic identities, among others. [61] Canadian NGOs are instrumental in helping to establish these core components required for enduring peace. Their development work in health care, hunger relief, refugee assistance, education, agricultural development, etc., is evidence of this commitment.

The Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative (created in 1996, the Hon. Lloyd Axworthy) is exemplary of this type of collaboration between the Canadian government, academic institutions and NGOs to develop foreign policy aimed at peacebuilding abroad. The Initiative is aimed at helping conflict-ridden countries in their effort towards peace and stability, by supporting locally-generated peacebuilding initiatives (such as demobilization and strengthening democracy) to improve their effectiveness and sustainability. The Initiative, showing its Canadian spirit, also seeks to combine Canadian peacebuilding efforts in a multilateral fashion with other governments, the UN, and regional organizations. [62] Highlighted by the Initiative is how Canada’s experience as a peacekeeper has contributed to its expertise in the many diverse areas of peacebuilding.

Engaging civil society and being attuned to public interests is another way in which the Canadian government can involve other actors in building capacity abroad. [63] The open dialogue between state and society ensures that the formulation of foreign policy is legitimized, and it can reinforce the importance of the human security agenda. In the 1980s and 1990s, the Canadian government still tended to act in the interests on NATO, but they were becoming more sensitive to the social agenda, which showed significant interest in human security. [64] The media also plays a critical role in amassing public interest and support for issues like human security, and can lead to placing societal pressure on the government to pursue certain foreign policy. It can also be used as a tool to gauge public support or adversity to foreign policy decisions. A strong economic foundation is critical in capacity building, and this is an area that can be best dealt with by the Canadian private sector. The UN and other intergovernmental organizations such as the World Bank are increasingly turning to the private sector for help in peacebuilding. “Low levels of economic development and other deficiencies in local capacities may motivate actors to violence, due to the low opportunity cost of war and the opportunities for private gains from violence” [65] It is for this reason that failed states need help in creating employment and other economic opportunities that will uphold peace over the long term and prevent future conflict. Canadian businesses can help with economic stabilization by assisting the failed states establish new enterprises, open investment opportunities, develop the rule of law, practice successful conflict resolution, and enter free-market trade that will lead to economic growth. [66] Examples of where the private sector has been successful in peacemaking include the transition from apartheid to a multiracial state in South Africa, and in Mozambique’s economic recovery in 1992 (the private sector worked with the government and other multilateral institutions to attract the foreign investment required for economic recovery). [67]

As it has been shown, there are many ways in which Canada can contribute to the international peacebuilding process, beyond militaristic humanitarian interventions measures (which are becoming hotly debated in the international community). Canada’s recent provision of $20 million to the peacekeeping effort in Sudan [68] has shown that Canada is indeed still committed to protecting human rights abroad. However, recent statements by Prime Minister Paul Martin criticizing the UN’s slow response to the Sudan crisis are indicative of the many challenges that face the implementation of humanitarian intervention today. [69]

The new world era is marked with a plentitude of threats to human security like it has never experienced before. The fundamental shift in world politics has changed the way that global actors face these challenges, and old methods must be adapted to face new problems. Axworthy makes clear that a difference must be made, as “it has become clear that problems in one part of the world can have a serious impact in another, including here at home…geography is less and less of a defense…increasingly we cannot protect our citizens with armies and bombs alone.” [70] By reinforcing its commitment to militaristic UN peacekeeping, alongside engaging non-state actors in broader peacebuilding initiatives, Canada will be best suited to build capacity abroad, and ultimately to assist in the development of a lasting global peace.


[1] Canadian International Development Agency, “Peacebuilding Initiative Strategic Framework.” Available Online.

[2] Lloyd Axworthy, “Introduction.” In Rob McCrae and Don Hubert, eds. Human Security and the New Diplomacy, (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 2001), 3-4.

[3] Robert D. Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy.” The Atlantic Monthly 273, no. 2 (February 1994): 44-65. Available on-line from ProQuest.

[4] Lloyd Axworthy, 4.

[5] Graham Evans, and Jeffrey Newnham. “Peacekeeping.” The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations. (London: Penguin Books, 1998), 425.

[6] Ibid, 425.

[7] The Suez Crisis of 1956 was between Egypt and an alliance consisting of France, the United Kingdom, and Israel. The conflict was over the control of the Suez Canal, which the alliance had economic and trading interests in. On October 29, Israel, backed by the alliance, successfully invaded the region, resulting in war. Lester Pearson helped create the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to sustain conflict in the area. The US governed a ceasefire and the invading forces withdrew in March 1957. Only Israel gained significantly from the war. For more information, please see “Suez Crisis” at http://www.Wikipedia. com

[8] J.L. Granatstein, “Peacekeeping: Did Canada Make a Difference? And what Difference Did Peacekeeping Make to Canada?” In John English and Norman Hillmer, eds. Making A Difference. (Toronto: Lester Publishing Limited, 1992), 222.

[9] Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, 426.

[10] has an extensive list of UN PKOs between 1948 and 1989, listed under “Timeline of UN peace-keeping missions.” These have included Israel 1948, India-Pakistan 1949, Suez 1956, Lebanon 1958, Congo 1960, West Guinea 1962, Cyprus 1964, Syria 1973, Lebanon 1978, Afghanistan-Pakistan 1988, Iran-Iraq 1988, Namibia 1989 and Angola 1989.

[11] Patricia Fortier, “The Evolution of Peacekeeping.” In Rob McCrae and Don Hubert, eds. Human Security and the New Diplomacy (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 2001), 42.

[12] J. L. Granatstein, 225.

[13] Ibid, 224.

[14] Ibid, 222.

[15] Andrew F. Cooper, “Multilateral Leadership: The Changing Dynamics of Canadian Foreign Policy.” In John English and Norman Hillmer, eds. Making A Difference. (Toronto: Lester Publishing Limited, 1992), 200.

[16] J. L. Granatstein, 229.

[17] Harald Von Riekhoff and Maureen Appel Molot. “Introduction: A Part of the Peace.” In Maureen Appel Molot and Harald von Riekhoff, eds. A Part of the Peace: Canada Among Nations 1994. (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1994), 17.

[18] Andrew Cooper, 201.

[19] James Patrick Sewell, “A World Without Canada: Would Today’s United Nations be the Same?” In John English and Norman Hillmer, eds. Making A Difference. (Toronto: Lester Publishing Limited, 1992), 195.

[20] James Patrick Sewell, 195.

[21] Patricia Fortier, 42.

[22] Michael W. Doyle, and Nicholas Sambanis. “International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis.” American Political Science Review, 94, No. 4 (December 2000): 781. Available on-line from JSTOR.

[23] Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, 426.

[24] Patricia Fortier, 44.

[25] Patricia Fortier, 48.

[26] Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, 795.

[27] Tom Keating, “The Future of Canadian Multilateralism.” In Maureen Appel Molot and Harald von Riekhoff, eds. A Part of the Peace: Canada Among Nations 1994. (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1994), 56.

[28] Lloyd Axworthy, 11.

[29] Patricia Fortier, 44.

[30] James Patrick Sewell, 184-5.

[31] Lloyd Axworthy, 6.

[32] Patricia Fortier, 42.

[33] The failures of PKOs in Somalia (1992), Bosnia (1992-5) and Rwanda (1994) exemplify the financial, political and institutional costs to states associated with peacekeeping operations. For more information, please refer to Keating, 61.

[34] Tom Keating, 61.

[35] James Patrick Sewell, 187.

[36] Lloyd Axworthy, 8.

[37] A UN Chapter VI mission refers to classic peacekeeping under the UN Charter, which entails the pacific resolution of disputes. For more information, please refer Evans and Newnham, 426.

[38] Patricia Fortier, 47.

[39] LGen Romeo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2003).

[40] Patricia Fortier, 46.

[41] James Patrick Sewell, 185.

[42] Ibid, 184.

[43] Patricia Fortier, 47.

[44] Tom Keating, 58.

[45] Lloyd Axworthy, 4.

[46] Ibid, 13.

[47] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, “About the Commission.” Available online.

[48] Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, “The Responsibility to Protect,” Foreign Affairs 81 no. 6 (Nov/Dec 2002), 99. Available online from Proquest.

[49] Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun.

[50] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, “The Responsibility to Protect,” December 2001.

[51] J.L. Granatstein, 231.

[52] Andrew Cooper, 216.

[53] Lloyd Axworthy, 8- 9.

[54] Joseph Nye. “Soft Power.” Foreign Policy Vol. 80 (Fall 1990): 153-71.

[55] Lloyd Axworthy, 9.

[56] Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, 779.

[57] Lloyd Axworthy, 13.

[58] James Patrick Sewell, 197; Andrew Cooper, 212.

[59] Andrew Cooper, 213.

[60] Ibid, 211.

[61] Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, 779.

[62] Canadian International Development Agency, “Peacebuilding Initiative Strategic Framework.” Available online.

[63] Andrew Cooper, 207.

[64] Ibid, 207.

[65] Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, 780.

[66]Allan Gerson,“Peace Building: The Private Sector’s Role.” The American Journal of International Law, 95, No. 1 (January 2001): 103. Available On-line from JSTOR.

[67] Allan Gerson, 108.

[68] CBC News Online Staff, “Canada to give $20 million for Sudan: report.” The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 9 Sept 2004. Available online at

[69] CBC News Online Staff, “Martin criticizes slow response to disaster in Sudan,” The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 22 Sept 2004. Available online at

[70] Lloyd Axworthy, 11.


6 responses to “Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding:

  1. hey guys thanks alot for all the insight. really liked the part. and iam starting to give it a shot. if you have any other good books or websites on the subject, love to hear from you. thanks over again.

  2. Many thanks for your can be of help!

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  5. Amgalanbaatar

    heey thank you, it is usefull information. thanks again 🙂

  6. rizalito benito

    hello it is very significant information for me as reader from the most vulnerable community as young leader from ARMM region….your are totally correct because as of now as what I experience and observed in my own community not only the war is state between state also the state itself because of more democratic fronts within the nation who want to separate and form an autonomous governance, so that we can not deny the fact that war as of now are present anywhere ,nation to nation,tribe to tribe ideology to ideology…….. sad to say that we could not end the so-called war…..there for i conclude that if we want peace we don’t need to talk to our friend instead we talk to our enemy through peace talk!!!!!

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